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The Cosmological Argument
A Current Bibliographical Appraisal

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[EDITOR'S NOTE: In our recent restructuring of Philosopha Christi, we set aside the tradition of publishing the annual presidential address. However, to bring closure to the tradition, and with an apology for the delay, we here present the final address that was delivered at our national meeting in November 1998.]

To begin, just a word about my topic. I intend this purely as a descriptive assessment of where we are at this point in the discussion of the cosmological argument. I will add nothing new, but so much discussion has occurred over the last years, especially even the last five, that I think some summation and agenda-setting might be helpful. That will be my limited purpose in what follows.

I should add that, due to the overwhelming amount of material, I will restrict my attention to the traditional form of the argument. Particularly, I will leave to others an assessment of both the Kalaam and Swinburne's inductive arguments. Nor will I get into the constantly increasing literature exegeting Thomas.

When I first began writing, it was, significantly, twenty-five years since the publication of Bruce Reichenbach's The Cosmological Argument (1972). I think it was this event that marked the beginning of more positive evaluation of the argument within broader philosophical circles. Further encouragement and stimulus came from the appearance, two years later, of Norm Geisler's Philosophy of Religion (1974). The next year saw the publication of William Rowe's The Cosmological Argument (1975), the culmination of several earlier projects. Prior to Reichenbach, the discussion had been largely negative, mostly based on Kantian-type objections against Leibniz/Clarke-type arguments. Given the general presuppositionalism, as well as the standard rejections of Carl Henry and Gordon Clark, evangelicals were not often on the affirmative side. There were of course among Christian philosophers some exceptions, like the Catholic Thomists Mascall,
Maritain, Gilson, others.

Rowe (1975) notes that a weak PSR has never been proven false, while a strong PSR has. The other hand, there is no known proof that it is not, and if it is, that the project of responding to such a proof is not known to be true. Hence, the cosmological argument, despite the difficulties associated with it, is still appealing and has been developed. Adams (1978) in his review of Rowe's response to the cosmological argument, suggests that the notion that a strong PSR is not provable is a false assumption. The argument is presented as a response to the idea that the cosmological argument is self-evident, and hence, not in need of proof.

Smith (1995) argues that Rowe's response fails because he has not provided a non-circular argument. Rowe has failed to address the issue of whether there are contingent facts, and if there are, how they are related to the problem of sufficient reason. Rowe's response does not provide a clear and compelling argument against the necessity of God, and hence, does not provide a non-circular argument. Rowe's response is thus not a sufficient reason to reject the cosmological argument.

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Rowe (1997) responds to Adams, pointing out that Rowe's response to the cosmological argument is not consistent with his own views on the nature of God. The cosmological argument is presented as a response to the idea that the cosmological argument is self-evident, and hence, not in need of proof.

Vallicella (1997), however, has responded that Rowe's response is insufficient. Rowe's response has not provided a non-circular argument, and hence, does not provide a sufficient reason for rejecting the cosmological argument. Rowe's response has failed to address the issue of whether there are contingent facts, and if there are, how they are related to the problem of sufficient reason. Rowe's response is thus not a sufficient reason to reject the cosmological argument.

Hence, the cosmological argument remains a topic of discussion, with Rowe responding to Adams, and Vallicella responding to Rowe. The debate continues, and the issue of whether the cosmological argument is self-evident is still unresolved.

2. **Causality Issues**

Several types of objections come under this heading. One is easily dismissed, and has thankfully all but disappeared from the journal literature. The other, though it seems to linger on in philosophical circles, namely, Hume's objection, is still evoking discussion. Rowe also advocates an elimination of non-circular arguments as a sufficient reason for rejecting the cosmological argument.
3. The Problem of Bad Science

The problem of bad science, primarily addressed by philosophers such as W. David Beck, involves the critique of scientific arguments that are considered flawed due to methodological or logical errors. Beck, in his work, explores how contemporary science, particularly cosmological arguments, can suffer from methodologies that are not well-grounded in rigorous scientific principles. He discusses the failures of such arguments, highlighting how they may be faulty due to issues such as causality, contingency, and the applicability of premises.

Beck's analysis suggests that while modern science is a powerful tool, it is not infallible. There are instances where the premises of scientific arguments are not adequately supported or where the chain of reasoning is flawed. This can lead to conclusions that are not robust and may be subject to further scrutiny and refutation.

Philosophers like Robert Chisholm have argued that for an argument to be well-constructed, it must be coherent and have premises that are adequately supported. This coherence and support are crucial for an argument to be considered strong within the realm of scientific discourse. Beck's work contributes to this discussion by pointing out specific instances where these conditions are not met, thereby highlighting the need for greater caution in the acceptance of scientific claims.

In summary, Beck's contribution to the field of philosophy of science is significant insofar as it provides a critical perspective on the methods and premises that underpin contemporary scientific discourse, thereby promoting a more rigorous and methodologically sound approach to science.
the overall metaphysical analysis of causality in the cosmological argument. Absent such, I suggest that this objection be put to rest.

4. The Conclusion Is Not God

If Thomas had only come up with a better ending to each of the Five Ways! I know he meant well, but he created no end of problems. On the other hand, there really is little excuse for this objection anymore; nevertheless it is quite frequent. The best current example is Martin (1990) where I count it three times.

Some rather dramatic versions are like Kaufmann’s (1958) claim that the God of Aquinas’s theology is not the God of Job, Moses, or Jesus. More subtle is Flew’s (1966) remark that the idea of God as a logically necessary being is clearly not a biblical one.

Other examples are not hard to find. Matson (1965) claims that the conclusion of first cause might well just be the big bang. Martin (1990) allows for the same conclusion to some feature of the universe or the universe itself.

Another version is that the conclusion is empty. Le Poidevin (1996) offers the contention that “first cause” is uninformative. It simply repeats the assertion that there is a cause, it says nothing about it, and so cannot be identified with God.

Martin (1999) adds other possibilities. He thinks that the argument implies nothing about intelligence or knowledge, and especially nothing related to perfection or goodness. Thus, the conclusion does not get us beyond natural process, even something evil. For that matter, he alleges that Reichenbach, in particular, fails to rule out plurality.

Now there is an important issue here, and one that the cosmological argument shares with all of the others. All too often we see popular versions that simply overstate the conclusion. Clearly, it is important to the integrity of this and all of the theistic arguments that one, first, be very precise as to the actual content of the conclusion, and, second, be very clear to separate extensions of the conclusion as further arguments or implications.

Those points have been the common response to the above objection. Geisler (1974, 1588) notes that the conclusion of the argument is the simple existence of an uncaused cause. At the same time, this concept can be extended by argument to demonstrate singularity, immateriality, simplicity, and infinity. In turn, these concepts can be extended to imply more specific attributes of God.

Shepherd (1975), whose study of the argument I think is both one of the finest and also most neglected, concludes to a CEB … a cosmos-explaining-being. Nothing more. But then he shows how to derive by further argument properties like perfection and creator/sustainer.

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Kretzmann (1996) in a study of an often overlooked version of the argument in the Summa contra Gentiles simply refers to the conclusion as alpha, but notes how Thomas carefully and properly extends the discussion to include important and identifying properties of God.

I need to mention one related objection. Both Flew (1966) and Gale (1991) argue that the first cause conclusion implies that God is the cause of evil. In fact, for Gale, this becomes the conclusive reason for rejecting the cosmological argument. Gale’s study is an extremely valuable addition to the literature that has not gotten enough attention. Several reviewers have examined other features of the study (Helm, 1993 and Jeffrey, 1996), but not his discussion of the cosmological argument. Having worked his way around many objections, including Rowe’s and Edwards’s, to three apparently sound versions, he then proceeds to argue that all three have improvable conclusions since each refers to an unsurpassably great being. This conclusion would involve its being maximally excellent in a moral sense, but the section on the problem of evil he had already concluded that such a being is logically impossible given certain evil properties of the world.1

I will not comment on this issue further except to note that Gale’s objection is not internal to the cosmological argument. But then that appears to be true of all such “the-cause-its-God” objections. While they remind us to be cautious about overstating the conclusion and also to point out the appropriate role of a cosmological argument in a cumulative case, they have no bearing as such on the soundness of the argument.

5. The Problem of Uncaused Contingents

As I understand the logic of the Thomistic argument the concept of necessity is derived not in the opening premises from possibility, but in an extension of the conclusion based on its uncaused nature. As a result, great deal hinges on the issue of whether there could be a contingent being that is uncaused. If so, then the conclusion to an uncaused cause in a set of causes gets us nowhere.

Craighead (1975), in his rejoinder to Reichenbach (1972), asserts that causeless contingent is possible. It is possible because it is conceivable.

1 In several publications subsequent to the writing of this article, Gale has accepted a combination cosmological/teleological argument for a finite God that bypasses the objection to evil. See, for instance, “A New Argument for the Existence of God: One that Works, Well” in The Rationality of Theism, edited Godehard Bruntrup and Ron Tacelli (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).
Mackie (1988) has a similar assessment. He claims that the principle that “nothing comes from nothing” is clearly not \textit{a priori} and that therefore the existence of an uncaused being is perfectly conceivable.

I find Shepherd (1975) especially helpful on this issue. He provides an extended discussion of the various definitions of contingency, noting that in the argument it functions not as a property of propositions but of existents. He finds five components: (1) dependence on God; (2) dependence on other existents; (3) transience; (4) lack of ontological self-sufficiency; and (5) capacity to arouse a sense of ontological shock. It is the last one, our intellectual need to seek a final explanation of the very existence of a universe at all, he labels “world-contingency,” which he develops and defends, especially against Nielsen’s charge that this is only a culturally conditioned, emotional response. All of this converges on the idea that “necessity” refers to the property of self-sufficiency: the lack of needing explanation. Hence, the cosmological argument simply demands that there be a world-explaining but itself unexplained existent. An uncaused contingent is therefore contradictory.

Reichenbach (1975), in his response to Craighead (1975), noted that the assertion that a causeless contingent is conceivable is empty. Craighead gives no argument beyond the purely psychological claim. I can, in some sense, conceive of round squares, but that is no argument for the actual possibility of such existents. I would add that I see nothing more in Mackie’s (1988) Humean argument either. Some notion of psychological conceivability is simply irrelevant to questions of actual possibility.

Norris Clarke (1988) provides a good treatment of the argument that a being which is self-sufficient for its own existence must therefore be infinite along the lines that it would otherwise have to both exist and not exist at the same time. Thus, the concept of a causeless contingent, again, is contradictory.

Davis (1997) notes that it is possible that there be an everlasting contingent but not a causeless one. It is everlasting because God causes it always to exist. He concludes, “I cannot imagine a possible scenario in which there exists no necessary being and there does exist an everlasting contingent being.”

Some of this issue may well be conceptual and Adler (1980) reminds us that contingent is a radical notion. A contingent existent that ceases to be does not transmute into some other mode of existence. Its ceasing to be, that is, its ontological dependency, is replaced by absolutely nothing at all.

This is an important part of the argument, especially the Thomistic version. Without it, the conclusion to an uncaused cause may leave us with no more than an unexplained contingent, say a big bang or perhaps eternal matter. Though we should note that in first cause arguments it effects only the extension of the conclusion and is not an objection to the argument itself.

For contingency arguments like Reichenbach’s it uncouples the interest in move from contingent existents to necessary existent and so is far more crucial.

My judgment is that so far no one has brought forward a viable formalization of this objection and that theistic responses have been sufficient. Nevertheless, this is a difficult metaphysical issue that deserves continued scrutiny.

6. Existence as a Predicate

While this issue is normally relegated to discussions of the ontological argument, Kenny (1979) alleges that it affects the cosmological argument as well. It is, he argues, a property so thin and so vague that it is largely uninteresting. Hence, it invalidates the argument. There can be arguments of the form in reference to the relation of properties to a thing, not that something “is.”

The discussion in Hughes (1995) is most relevant here. The very premise of his study is that one must clarify the concept of existence before one can move on to the extensions of the cosmological argument such as regularity and simplicity.

Existence as the property relevant to the cosmological argument is a capacity to enter into causal relations. This is certainly not an uninteresting property. It distinguishes for example between the number two and the Eiffel tower. If one adds modal qualifiers like contingent and necessary, then one has even more interesting properties. Necessary existence, for example, can be defined as the property of being "unable to cease to be capable of entering into causal relations."

It seems clear to me that Kenny and others are simply wrong here. I think that “is” can function only as an empty term between subjects and predicates. It can also indicate an interesting property.

7. Are Infinite Regresses Possible?

The real crux of the first cause argument is the denial of an infinite regress of dependent causes of existence. This factor is what forces the conclusion to an existent which is not itself the effect of any cause. So if it turns out that the appropriate type of infinite regress is possible there will be no inference to a first cause.

Contingency arguments also depend on a kind of denial of infinite regress, namely of sufficient reasons. Here it must be shown that no contingent conjunction, combination, or set of contingents, even if infinite, would provide a truly and ultimate sufficient reason.
9. Necessary Existence Issues

As we all learned in our undergraduate philosophy classes, the concept of necessary existence is found in the etymology of the word "necessity." Thomas'}s (1988) version of the cosmological argument is presented clearly in his book "Lehrsätze und Erkenntnis" (1980). The text also discusses the compatibility of necessary existence with causality, as opposed to the insufficient causality that is characteristic of emergentism. The discussion includes the work of other philosophers, such as Koons (1997).
the things, not a purely conceptual condition, that consists for God in his being a terminus of explanation.

This, of course, remains part of a larger discussion about the nature of necessity. While I see no convincing argument that necessity can only be the logical necessity of propositions, it also seems correct that self-explanation, as Penelhum (1960) contends, is contradictory. But the cosmological argument only needs the concept of a negated contingency: an end to explanation, dependency or causality, itself unexplained. Clearly, work remains on this possible objection, but, while it provides some challenges to contingency arguments, it seems irrelevant to first cause arguments.

Smart (1996) admits the coherence of the concept but thinks that such an entity is not God; it might simply be the universe. That is an objection we have dealt with.

10. Is There a Fallacy of Composition Here?

In my experience perhaps the most frequent objection to all forms of the cosmological argument is that they commit the fallacy of composition, that is, they attribute to the whole a property of the parts. There are actually two allegations here. One is a specific logical blunder some find in Thomas’s Third Way, the other is a general fault alleged against all contingency arguments; namely that they infer the contingency of the universe as a whole from an unvarying contingency of each existent.

Let me begin with the Third Way. Plantinga (1967) claimed that there was a quantifier mistake in Thomas’s move from “everything can fail to exist at some time” to “everything fails to exist at some time.”

Ross (1980) refers to it as an illegitimate reversal of existential and universal quantifiers.

Most often, however, this mistake of Thomas is simply noted as obvious with little care either to demonstrate precisely what the mistake is or to demonstrate by careful exegesis of the text that Thomas actually commits it. Martin (1990) is a good example.

Haldane (1996) and Fogelin (1990) are two recent attempts to exonerate Thomas. Both argue that the appearance of temporality in the Third Way is strictly part of the definition of contingency.

For example, it is important to distinguish Thomas’s notion of contingent from that of the contemporary modal logician. Thomas’s concept has termination or temporal limitation built in. For Haldane, too, the solution lies in recognizing that time functions in the Third Way only as part of the context of contingency. Since Thomas’s argument is not about temporal succession, it cannot be translated or interpreted as implying a point in the past at which time nothing existed. This is no: a horizontal argument but a vertical one. So

the Third Way simply argues that if truly everything needs to be caused to exist then nothing would exist. While this is not the easiest or most obvious reading of Thomas, it certainly fits his pattern more consistently.

The other locus of an alleged fallacy of composition is in contingent arguments that refer to the universe as a whole. Angeles (1974) and Martin (1990) are typical examples of recent claims that such cosmological arguments illicitly move from the claim that everything has a cause to the claim that the universe has a cause.

Three points have been made in the recent literature. The first is Davies (1997) reminder that the problem is bypassed by not referring to the universe as a whole. None of the Thomistic arguments, for example, make this move.

Second, Miller (1995) points out that the fallacy of composition is not an informal or material fallacy, not a formal one. That is, it has to be assessed on a case by case basis as noted by Rowe (1962) and Reichenbach (1973). The problem here is that no one has identified a decision procedure for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate conclusions from parts to whole. Think of it as a picture puzzle in which every piece is triangular. Can one conclude that the whole puzzle is triangular? Clearly not. But if each piece is red, then surely the whole is red also. But why shape functions differently from color, and what a general decision procedure would look like has yet to be determined.

Nevertheless, conclusions from parts to whole clearly are sometimes legitimate. Thus one way to defend the cosmological argument is to argue that contingency or modality in general operates like color, not shape, for Miller (1995), Adler (1980) and others have done. This seems convincing, but would certainly be stronger if a general decision protocol were available.

A third tactic is to argue directly for the contingency of the whole. Koons (1997) for example does so, as does Wainwright (1988). Typically, this involves arguing for the need of an explanation that there is a universe at all, rather than constructing a conjunction of all of its parts. This bypasses Edwards’s (1959) now famous Eskimo analogy, and is, in general, a simpler and less vulnerable approach.

B. New Forms of the Argument

One of the difficulties in assessing the cosmological argument is that new versions of the argument in the twentieth century have been about as frequent as the authors who have written about it. Even those configurations specific historical versions have almost invariably, like Mackie (1982), Miller and Martin (1990), provided their own restatements of them. Usually, these new wordings are attempts to avoid a specific objection or to bring out a particular failure.
In a way, they represent the cutting edge of the current debate, with certain new advances and other niceties built in.

I want here to comment briefly on two recent additions to the discussion. In a paper (1) Robert Koons (1997) article in the American Philosophical Quarterly, develops a good example of using the Aristotelian Thomistic argument of contingency in all the pitfalls identified in the recent discussion and applying them to the cosmology, and so bypasses composition issues. It is still susceptible to identification-type problems, but Koons includes an excellent development of corollaries that follow the traditional lines.

The weak points are, first, its use of modalities, but Koons develops a standard modal logic supplemented with a calculus individual that deals with contingency problems, and Koons includes an excellent development of corollaries that follow the traditional lines. Second, it does assume an equivalence of individuals that denial of an infinite regress, in the form of the claim (or argument) that any non-empty set of facts can be aggregated into a single fact, a strategy that all contingent facts would be radical skepticism. Thus, it is somewhat vulnerable but along lines that have strong support. Third, it assumes a principle of the universal, it is empirically supported, and its denial of the premise (4) Koons argues that it may be empirically supported and that its denial of the premise (that being) would be radical skepticism. Thus, it is somewhat vulnerable but along lines that have strong support.

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First, we consider the role of science in the debate over the existence of God. Many scientific arguments have been presented to support the existence of God, such as the cosmological, design, and Kraus arguments. We note that these arguments are based on the assumption that there is a design to the universe, and that this design is indicative of the existence of a supreme being.

Second, we consider the role of theology in the debate over the existence of God. Theology has played a significant role in the debate over the existence of God, with many theologians and philosophers arguing that the existence of God is a matter of faith, and that faith cannot be supported by reason.

Finally, we consider the relationship between science and theology. We argue that science and theology are not incompatible, and that they can be used to complement each other in the debate over the existence of God.

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